Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not?
Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? You certainly are not alone. You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident.
In these elegiac verses: But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding.
And did you not think that he knew? Socrates proceeds on the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, and it is quickly agreed that, if this is true, virtue is teachable. I do not understand. Meno proposes a number of possible definitions. What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.
But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.
Socrates answers by reminding Meno that Meno's own countrymen, the Thessalians, have recently gained a reputation for wisdom, due chiefly to the rising fame of Gorgias a Sophist teacher.
While Plato spent his time pontificating about the existence of an unseen realm, Aristotle had his feet firmly planted on the ground.
For how can we know know how to attain virtue if we do not know adequately what virtue is. He reminds Meno that previously they said that in order for a man to be profitable and good, he must have knowledge.
Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we thought, it was taught?
By the end of the dialogue, the participants which include Anytus, who enters toward the end and has a minor role have arrived at the classic state of Socratic aporia--they still do not know what virtue is, but at least they now know that they do not know.
Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always.
And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action-there we were also right? No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. And the space of four feet is made from this half line?
Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. And he may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them himself.
Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Myles Burnyeat and others, however, have argued that the phrase aitias logismos refers to a practical working out of a solution, rather than a justification.
What do you say to this answer? He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to attain that kind of wisdom and-virtue by which men order the state or the house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?
The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much. But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge.
Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue-that there are other virtues as well as justice. I can tell why you made a simile about me. Meno, however, is still somewhat unsure what Socrates is getting at.Plato reveals the views of Socrates on the query of whether virtue is knowledge and whether virtue may be taught in a number of dialogues, mainly in Meno.
In the dialogue, Socrates creates several differing arguments on virtue, which include the definition of virtue and questions on whether persons can attain it. Meno (/ ˈ m iː n oʊ /; Greek: Μένων, Menōn) is a Socratic dialogue written by cheri197.com appears to attempt to determine the definition of virtue, or arete, meaning virtue in general, rather than particular virtues, such as justice or cheri197.com first part of the work is written in the Socratic dialectical style and Meno is reduced to confusion or aporia.
Aug 27, · Summary of Meno for ED Table of Contents: - Meno – first step in an understanding of the educational project - What is virtue? - Prior. Meno: What Is Virtue? Aditya Venkataraman ID - Word count - ‘Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught?’, begins Meno, a beautiful and wealthy general, accustomed to giving grand answers to every question [76b].
Yet, within a few exchanges, he is. On the Teaching of Virtue in Plato’s Meno and the Nature of Philosophical Authority Abraham D.
Stone May 2, Abstract Socrates and Meno reach two diﬀerent conclusions: in the ﬁrst part of. Discussion of Virtue in Meno by Socrates Words Jan 28th, 3 Pages In the dialogue, Socrates creates several differing arguments on virtue, which include the definition of virtue and questions on whether persons can attain it.Download